In contemporary debate language, we collectively refer to the value premise/criterion model as the “standard” for “weighing the truth” of the resolution. During the debate rounds that I have judged, I have not seen much evidence that demonstrates “how” this works. Traditionally, debaters have been taught to use the value premise/criterion model with little if any theoretical justification. The focus of this section is to merge theory and practice – an approach to the value premise/criterion model that will hopefully “clean up” debates.
Over the years we have developed three preferences for what constitutes a “good” standard for evaluating a resolution: (1) objectivity to ensure a level playing field for clash, (2) a reasonable calculus with which the debaters and judge may weigh competing arguments, and (3) a relevant measure of the resolution’s truth. I believe that the following reformulation of the value premise/criterion model will satisfy our first two tastes. The third element, however, is one that we proclaim to favor yet have done little to ensure. I will attempt to provide a solution that integrates theory with practice (value premise/criterion model) and in turn offer a direct method of evaluating a proposition of value.
A brief statement, though, about this portion of the series: if, at times, it seems that I am moving back and forth between theory and practice in determining what we should or should not do, I am. As mentioned, L-D theory has never been outlined. I find it most helpful to take what we have in terms of practice and attempt to align it with a workable theory. After all, there is not much sense in throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Value Premise: A “Standard?”

The value premise is perhaps the most enigmatic feature of the L-D round. If you assembled twenty debaters, judges, and coaches together and asked them each, “What is the purpose of the value premise?,” I guarantee that you would be given twenty different answers. Many people may answer that the value premise acts as an anchor between argumentation and the resolution. This is moving in the right direction. On the other hand, many people may answer that the value premise is a standard for weighing argumentation.
The value premise, though, should be less of a “standard” than one may think. Assume, though, that we use the “standard” approach to the value premise. The debater chooses a “value” that he believes is an important vantage from which to evaluate the resolution. Take the nuclear weapons topic. A debater decides to argue that nuclear deterrence is the action of an unjust or “illegitimate” government. Accordingly he chooses the value premise of “governmental legitimacy” and goes on to prove the previous statement is true. This resolution that he has addressed, though, is: The possession of nuclear weapons is governmentally illegitimate. The problem he has encountered is not necessarily terminal. To remedy this problem, the debater must prove that that which is immoral is consequently that which is governmentally illegitimate. While there is nothing logically “wrong” about approaching the topic like this, doing so will only add an unnecessary and murky layer to the round. Arguing about what constitutes an immoral action is difficult enough. To add two separate layers to the mix (definition of “governmental illegitimacy” and relating “immorality” and “governmental illegitimacy”) is just calling for tangential discussions. The following diagram illustrates the debater’s construction and requirements:

Primary Evaluative Term
[Immoral]

^ Definition of the Primary Evaluative Term

^ Secondary Evaluative Term [Governmental Illegitimacy]

^ Definition of the Secondary Evaluative Term

^ Relationship between the Primary and Secondary Evaluative Terms

^ ''Descriptive Term [Possession of Nuclear Weapons]''

The above exemplifies a growing, yet subtle, problem in debate. Few debaters really see the relevance of the value premise and, as such, simply insert an “oldie but goodie” in order to pay lip service to judges that expect to hear the words “value premise.” As a result, at the end of the debate rounds, judges wonder whether or not either side has actually done much to prove the resolution is true or false. Very few debaters actually attempt to bridge the gap between the secondary and primary evaluative terms. Even fewer debaters pick up on this logical leap by their opponents.
To avoid this altogether, the debater ought to cut the intermediary step and use the resolution’s evaluative term as the value premise. If a clear evaluative term is not present (e.g., open-ended value analyses – see Part One of this article), the chosen subordinate evaluative term should be the value premise. By choosing the evaluative term as the value premise, the internal case structure functions like this:

Value Premise [Evaluative Term]
^ Definition of the Value Premise
^ Contentions [Relationship between the Descriptive Term and the Evaluative Term]

On paper this seems reasonable. If we agree that the goal is to relate the evaluative term to the descriptive term, then this model certainly provides for that. However, people have a practical issue with this, for the evaluative term is not always a “value,” per se. Many judges, coaches, and debaters believe that the value premise should be something that we “value,” or hold in esteem. This springs from a misinterpretation of the value premise. The value premise should not underscore something “to value” but rather something “to evaluate.” The purpose of L-D debate should not be a discussion of competing evaluative terms/values (e.g., morality vs. justice) unless the resolution specifically or implicitly calls for such discussion. L-D analysis is value-laden, though, and this often causes people to believe that L-D debate is about “values” in conflict. I can find one resolution from the past 20 years that explicitly requires such analysis (1984: Nothing that is politically right is morally wrong). Resolutions, however, requiring an open-ended value analysis are the closest that we have to this (perhaps this should give us cause to gradually distance ourselves from these). Regardless, “evaluative term vs. evaluative term” debates lead us to overly complex discussions that require more than the 45 minutes allotted. Bottom line: if the resolution has a clear evaluative term, avoid adding unnecessary hurdles and go straight for the evaluative term.
The following resolution will better illustrate this concern: Decentralized governmental power ought to be a fundamental goal of democratic society (2001 September/October). For this topic, many debaters furnished a value premise of “democracy.” This is how that value premise actually functioned:

Democracy [Value Premise]
^ Definition of the Value Premise
^ Decentralized Governmental Power [Descriptive Term]

Thus, a debater with a value of “democracy” is proving the following resolution is true: Decentralized governmental power is democracy (a different resolution in both letter and spirit). To make the argumentation sync up with the resolution requires the debater to jump through unnecessary and often meaningless rhetorical hoops. Using the “prescription” test, the evaluative term in this resolution is “fundamental goal of democracy.” Though the normative “ought” is present, this term only serves to give “fundamental goal of democracy” its prescriptive command. The value, then, should be “fundamental goal of democracy.” Using this as the value premise, the case works like this:

Fundamental Goal of Democracy [Value Premise]
^ Definition of the Value Premise
^ Decentralized Governmental Power [Descriptive Term]

However, many people probably do not consider a “fundamental goal of democracy” to be “valuable.” Remember, we want to evaluate the validity of the resolution – not assign it value. As the above structure stands, the debater has related the descriptive term to the evaluative term, and, as a result, met his/her burden of proof

Criterion: A Definition?
Recall from prior diagrams that I included “definition of the evaluative term/value premise” as an intermediary step between the evaluative term and the descriptive term(s). The word “definition” is perhaps a misnomer. As we have seen, the evaluative term for any given resolution is open to interpretation. What one may conceive of being “moral” is typically only one way to approach the term. As a result, a precise definition for the evaluative term is essential to provide clarity. However, even with a “precise” definition, much room for discussion and interpretation still exists. Suppose a debater offers a value premise of “morality” and defines that term as “the fulfillment of one’s duties.” This opens the door to a number of questions: Why is this the “best” definition for “morality?” What is a duty? What duties?
To answer these questions, we use the criterion. If the affirmative must relate the evaluative term to the descriptive term(s), then the criterion can be thought of as a “bridge” between the terms. The criterion has been categorized into a number of different approaches. Such approaches have been discussed elsewhere, and so I will not touch upon them here. For a particularly good classification, see Minh Luong’s article, “New Perspectives on Values and Criteria in Lincoln-Douglas Debate.”
A criterion can be anything from philosophically general (e.g., “protection of rights”) to pragmatically concrete (e.g., “increased funding of social security programs”). Regardless of one’s phrasing, I offer an “updated” version of the criterion that is consistent with the aforesaid theory discussions. If we use the evaluative term as the value premise, then the criterion should serve as a test for the evaluative term. For instance, using “fundamental goal of democracy” as the value premise, the criterion should determine “what” constitutes a fundamental goal of democracy. By arguing “that which empowers the individual” is a test for a fundamental goal of democracy, then the debater has provided a clear measure for argumentation. The debater has constructed the following model:
Fundamental Goal of Democracy [Value Premise & Evaluative Term]
^ ''That which Empowers the Individual [Criterion & “Test” for the Evaluative Term]''
^ ''Decentralized Governmental Power [Descriptive Term]''

The structure can be written as follows:

A fundamental goal of democracy is that which empower the individual. [A=B] Decentralized governmental power empowers the individual. [C=B] Decentralized governmental power is a fundamental goal of democracy. [C=A]

Sound familiar? The methodology that is offered here attempts to join together logical structure and theory. The debater, by using this approach to the value premise/criterion model, can approach the case from the major premise/minor premise vantage.
In general, I believe that the criterion should be the framework for succeeding argumentation. Most debaters try to fit a criterion with the most compelling argumentation that they can imagine. This will only lead to awkward analysis that fits somewhat with the provided criterion. I urge debaters to pack as much in as possible with the criterion.
With the November/December 2004 topic (The US has a moral obligation to promote democratic ideals in other nations), you could use a value premise of “moral obligation” and then define a “test” for determining when an action is or is not a moral obligation. You may argue that a moral obligation exists on the part of the entity if (1) a human rights violation presents itself, (2) the agent is capable of remedying that violation, and (3) no harm would result in the agent’s solution. In the case you could argue that promoting democratic ideals in other nations meets the aforementioned test and, thus, is a moral obligation. As you can see, the criteria have set the parameters for the evaluative term (moral obligation) and the case has bridged the gap between it and the descriptive term (promoting democratic ideals in other nations). Simply put, the offered criteria “define” the specifics of the evaluative term in order to provide a richer understanding of the resolution.

Negative Evaluation
With the negative, especially with propositions of absolute value, the value premise/criterion model is trickier. I have never really understood our practice of expecting a negative to prove the consistency of his/her “side” with a value premise. If the affirmative’s burden is to relate the descriptive term to the evaluative term, then the negative’s burden is to “prove” that relationship is not true. Observe the following diagram:

Value Premise: Moral Obligation
^ Criterion: Pass
^ ''Promoting Democratic Ideals [Descriptive Term]''

Implication: The US has a moral obligation to promote democratic ideals in other nations.