Introduction to Theory
The purpose of this article is to lay a foundation for subsequent discussions of L-D debate “theory.” By L-D debate theory I mean the “proper” ways of affirming and negating resolutions and how the judge ought to evaluate such performance. Other issues of strategy (crystallization, impacting, extending, speed, etc.) and case construction are both matters of practically applying a systematic approach to the previous three issues. Once we have agreed upon a theoretical approach to L-D, the other issues of execution will flow accordingly. I suppose at first glance this article may come across as trying to “reinvent the wheel.” I would respond that at this point in the game, we do not really even know what the “wheel” is.
Theory, however, does not arise out of a vacuum. Instead, theory originates from our basic expectations of the activity. Specifically, what do we want, in a nutshell, each debater to “do?” Beginning as atomically as possible is best. I offer an approach with which I think most will agree: the affirmative should prove the resolution is “true,” and the negative should prove the resolution is “false.” I am sure that most people will respond “of course” to the prior statement. However, at least one other fundamental approach exists, specifically regarding the expectation for the negative: the negative should prove the affirmative is false. While the difference seems trivial, the difference is the cause of much controversy surrounding the negative’s burden.
If we agree that the affirmative has the burden of “proof” and the negative has the burden of “disproof,” so to speak, then the next question is what constitutes “proof” and “disproof?” I believe that this question is best answered by examining the types of statements, or propositions, that are associated with L-D debate.
L-D debate focuses on propositions of value as opposed to propositions of fact or policy. A proposition of value has two essential ingredients: a descriptive term (once upon a time, these were known as “objects of evaluation”) or terms and an evaluative term (the “term” usually consists of multiple words, however). A descriptive term has a clear (or at least generally accepted) definition. Little room – aside from nitpicky quibbling – exists for debate over these words. A nuclear weapon, capital punishment, or a journalist’s right to shield confidential sources has prima facie recognition. These terms anchor their respective resolutions to the physical world. Evaluative terms, on the other hand, give propositions of value their distinct flavor. Evaluative terms question both loaded rhetoric that we use in common language and terms that have been hotly disputed by great thinkers during the course of Western thought. Notions of morality, justice, liberty, fundamental goals of a particular political system, and personal value judgments (e.g., “The individual ought to value X above Y”) are all recurring examples of evaluative terms used in L-D resolutions. The duty of each debater is to present or challenge definitions for the evaluative term and to discuss the relationship between the evaluative term and the descriptive term(s). This is the most basic illustration of what constitutes “proof” in terms of a value proposition.
A general test for identifying a resolution’s evaluative term is whether or not a particular word or series of words prescribes a proper course of behavior. Specifically, does the term call into question “goodness” and “badness?” If the term denotatively urges action, recognition, etc., then that is the evaluative term. It helps to identify words that connote “rightness” or “wrongness.” If, on the other hand, the word serves purely as a depiction of some physical (e.g., “capital punishment”) or even metaphysical (“sanctity of life”) object, the term is descriptive.
Function of the Evaluative Term in Various Types of Value Propositions
I begin with a caveat. I do not like debate jargon. In this section, I will use a number of phrases that I have originated; however, I use them only for the sake of swift cross-reference and clear continuity of ideas. The following are ways to help debaters, coaches, and judges think about resolutions – not ways to debate about resolutions.
The most basic type of value proposition is the proposition of absolute value. This proposition can be categorized into two subgroups:
1. Proposition of Explicit Absolute Value (A=B, where A & B are explicit)
These value propositions are the most straightforward resolutions available and used. The resolution simply equates a descriptive term to a clearly stated evaluative term. Take the following resolution: The possession of nuclear weapons is immoral (2002 January/February & 1992 March/April). The factual terms are “possession” and “nuclear weapons.” The evaluative term is “immoral.” The word “immoral” explicitly calls for a judgment about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of an action. The duty of the affirmative is to present a definition for “immoral” and to relate “the possession of nuclear weapons” to this definition. The negative has one of two options. The negative can challenge the relationship between the affirmative’s definition of “immoral” (or the negative’s definition, for that matter) and “the possession of nuclear weapons” (straight negation). Another route, albeit less direct, is that the negative can define “moral” or “amoral” and provide a relationship between “the possession of nuclear weapons” to this definition (affirmative negation). This approach also requires that the negative demonstrate that the affirmative’s definition of “immoral” and the negative’s definition of “moral” or “amoral” are mutually exclusive.
2. Proposition of Open-Ended Value Analysis (A=B, where A or B is vague)
As the name suggests, the evaluative term is less clear than the prior proposition. Terms such as “ought,” “justified,” and “value” all signal the presence of an open-ended value analysis. Denotatively, the previous three terms all command or defend a choice, action, condition, etc. However, the method by which the debater is to define the evaluative term is not clear. Observe the following resolution: Capital punishment is justified (1998 November/December). The definition of “justified” is “to be made ‘right.’” The term “right,” however, leaves this evaluative term even hazier than a typical evaluative term. Practically every philosophical text, from those of Aristotle to those of Rawls, is concerned with “rightness.” Thus, the debater must define the vague evaluative term with a less ambiguous evaluative term to clarify “rightness.” I will refer to this definition as the “subordinate evaluative term.” Justification may be found from a variety of value angles, including morality, justice, equality, or even social welfare. Because the evaluative term lacks much substance, the debater must further define the term with another evaluative term with substance (or at the very least context). This approach will be important to the next section regarding the evaluation of value propositions.
The affirmative’s burden of proof, then, is two-pronged. S/he must (1) prove why his/her choice of subordinate evaluative term is a good, if not the best, measure of justification, prescription, etc. and (2) define the subordinate evaluative term and relate the descriptive term to this definition. In response, the negative has two options. S/he may dispute either (1) the subordinate evaluative term as being the best measure (affirmative negation) or (2) the relationship between the affirmative’s proposed subordinate evaluative term and the descriptive term (straight negation). By taking the first approach, the negative must also (1) offer a competing subordinate evaluative term and (2) break the link between this evaluative term and the descriptive term.
The second type of value proposition is the comparative. Comparative resolutions can be categorized into three subgroups:
1. Comparisons made against an explicit evaluative term (A>B, based explicitly upon C)
As the name suggests, the evaluative term being called into question is clearly stated in the resolution. Two competing descriptive terms are measured according to their relevance to or consistency with an explicit evaluative term. Take the following resolution: Individual obedience to law plays a greater role in maintaining ethical public service than does individual obedience to conscience (1990 NFL Nationals). Using the “prescription test” mentioned earlier, the evaluative term is clear: ethical public service. Simply put, the affirmative must define the evaluative term (ethical public service) and then prove why his/her prescribed descriptive term (individual obedience to law) is more relevant to the definition of the evaluative term than the other descriptive term (individual obedience to conscience). The negative may either redefine the evaluative term or prove why his/her descriptive term is more relevant to the affirmative’s definition (or his/her own definition) of the evaluative term.
2. Comparisons made against an open-ended value analysis (A>B, based upon ?)
Much like the absolute value proposition with the similar name, these resolutions contain two clear descriptive terms and a vague evaluative term (e.g., “ought to be valued above,” “is more important than,” etc.). The following resolution illustrates: The individual ought to value the sanctity of life above the quality of life (1988 September/October & 1998 September/October). The descriptive terms are fairly straightforward: “sanctity of life” and “quality of life.” The evaluative term is “ought to value…above,” rooted in the term “individual.” The affirmative must define what the individual “ought to value” and then demonstrate the relevance of the affirmative descriptive term (sanctity of life) as opposed to the competing descriptive term (quality of life). The affirmative, however, is given a fairly large spectrum of definitions from which to choose. S/he could argue that the individual ought to use morality, autonomy, social beneficence, or even hedonic pleasure as the guide for action. As such, the debaters are afforded an “open-ended” selection of definitions for the evaluative term. The chosen definition is the “subordinate evaluative term.”
The burdens of proof for this type are similar to the open-ended value analysis. The affirmative still has the two-pronged burden of justifying his/her choice of subordinate evaluative term and relating the descriptive term to the definition of the subordinate evaluative term. The negative has two options in terms of strategy: (1) offer a competing subordinate evaluative term and demonstrate the relevance of the opposing descriptive term above the affirmative descriptive term or (2) adopt the affirmative subordinate evaluative term and argue that the opposing descriptive term is more relevant than the affirmative descriptive term.
3. Comparisons made against an implicit evaluative term (A>B, based implicitly upon C)
These propositions are subtler and can be easily confused with an open-ended value analysis. A vague evaluative term is present just like the prior comparative resolution. However, ironically, the subordinate evaluative term is embedded in the descriptive terms. The two descriptive terms set the framework for the “types” of arguments relevant to the affirmative’s burden of proof. These propositions typically deal with governmental propriety.
Take the following resolution: When in conflict, the letter of the law ought to take priority over the spirit of the law (2004 March/April & 1993 January/February). The descriptive terms are “letter of the law” and “spirit of the law.” The evaluative term (“ought to take priority over”) is too imprecise. A subordinate evaluative term is essential to clarify the term “priority.” However, the “types” of evaluative terms are significantly restricted to “values” that judge the justification of a legal or governmental feature. Thus, subordinate values that suggest “governmental prioritization” should be used to clarify the definition of the vague evaluative term. Other evaluative terms that do not have an intuitive link to the resolution’s implicit point of conflict are irrelevant and only force debates into tangential discussions. While “morality” is an important concept for discussion, for a debater to argue that we ought to use “morality” as a gauge of legal relevance seems specious. This is not only necessary for a subsequent discussion of evaluation, but also for giving the topic a much richer depth.
The final type of value proposition is the superlative. Prior to the announcement of the 2005 January/February topic (Democracy is best served by a strict separation of church and state), I had planned on not even discussing these because they are pretty rare. (I can only find one other example. The NCFL Nationals topic from 2003 – Capitalism is the most just economic system). However, they do exist in theory at least, and so I will mention them. Terms such as “best” or “most” signal the presence of a superlative. A superlative value proposition calls into question the supremacy of a descriptive term against all other alternatives. The key here is “alternatives.” The negative’s approach should be concerned with proposing a “better” alternative to the affirmative’s assigned descriptive term. Because the affirmative descriptive term is measured against the evaluative term, the alternative descriptive terms are rooted in that which is not the affirmative’s assigned term and the evaluative term in the resolution. To illustrate this concept, look to the “capitalism” topic mentioned above. Arguing that democracy is better than capitalism does not make sense because democracy is not an economic system (the evaluative term, specifically “just economic system”). Socialism would be a proper approach, though, because it is an economic system. The evaluative term may either be implicit or explicit.
The proposition of superlative value is peculiar insofar as it merges the burdens associated with absolute value and comparative value propositions. The affirmative must prove that, given the nature and definition of the evaluative term, the descriptive term is “most” directly related. The negative must prove that either the descriptive term has no relation to the evaluative term (straight negation) or that some other descriptive term has a “better” relation (comparative negation). In terms of the negative’s execution, the job gets tricky. Poking holes in the relationship between the evaluative term and the affirmative descriptive term must be countered with an alternative, for arguing why something is “not A” does not necessarily equate to “not the ‘best.’” For instance, suppose that the negative argues that capitalism only benefits the wealthy. Without proving that this makes the economic system inherently “unjust” (straight negation) or that another economic system better accounts for this problem (comparative negation), the negative has not disproved the resolution – the affirmative’s relationship between the evaluative term and the descriptive term still stands.
If you kept score, you will realize that my treatment of the negative’s burdens has been fairly scant. I did so intentionally. The theoretical approach to negating will be dealt with at length in a forthcoming article outside of this two-part series. Suffice it to say, several other logical yet “alternative” approaches exist to negating propositions of value. This matter, however, is a beast unto itself.
Conclusion to Part One
The first part of this article has been concerned with how to “read” propositions of value and better understand their burdens. While some may argue that this is an unnecessarily convoluted way of examining L-D topics, realizing that this is how such propositions function both rhetorically and semantically is important for two reasons. First, this approach provides students and coaches a clear roadmap for dissecting topics. Recognizing that the affirmative must create a relationship between the descriptive term(s) and the evaluative term underscores the key burdens inherent to affirming or negating propositions of value. Second, it provides a framework for how judges and debaters should evaluate competing arguments in terms of the validity of the resolution at hand. Evaluating propositions of value via the value premise/criterion model is the focus of the second part of this article.
(Jeff Doss is a junior at Tulane University where he is studying accounting and philosophy. As a former debater at Saint James School in Montgomery, AL, he competed under the direction of Mrs. Michele Coody during his four years of high school. He coaches L-D debate at Isidore Newman School in New Orleans and teaches at the University of Iowa and Samford University L-D institutes during the summer.)
